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Abstract
It is argued that local realism is a fundamental principle, which might
be rejected only if experiments clearly show that it is untenable. A critical
review is presented of the derivations of Bell´s inequalities and the performed
experiments, with the conclusion that no valid, loophole-free, test exists of
local realism vs. quantum mechanics. It is pointed out that, without any
essential modification, quantum mechanics might be compatible with local
realism. This suggests that the principle may be respected by nature.
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I. Introduction
Forty years have elapsed since John Bell1 ,2 discovered his celebrated in-
equalities. These inequalities, which involve measurable quantities, provide
necessary conditions for local realism. Bell also proved that, in some exper-
iments with ideal set-ups, the predictions of quantum mechanics violate the
inequalities. During these four decades a lot of papers have been written
pointing out quantum-theoretical violations of the inequalities in very many
different phenomena, but only a few dozens empirical tests have been actu-
ally performed. The results of all performed experiments are compatible with
local realism and, with few exceptions, agree with the quantum predictions
(see Secs. 5, 6 and 8 below). The logical interpretation of these facts, unbi-
ased by theoretical prejudices, should be that there is no empirical evidence
against local realism and that quantum mechanics has been confirmed, the
few disagreements with its predictions being of little significance. Neverthe-
less the standard wisdom is that local realism has been refuted, which is
concluded because allegedly plausible extrapolations of the empirical results
could violate a Bell inequality.
In my view the current wisdom is misleading and harmful for the progress
of science. Misleading because it attempts answering a fundamental scientific
question by means of a subjective assessment of plausibility. Harmful because
it discourages people from making the necessary effort to perform a real,
loophole-free, test.
The long time elapsed without a true disproof of local realism may be
compared, for instance, with the discovery of parity non-conservation, which
required a few months to go from the theoretical paper by Lee-Yang, in 1957,
to the uncontroversial (loophole-free) experiment by Wu et al. I think that
the logical conclusion of the long standing unsuccessful effort to disprove
local realism is that it is preserved by nature.
In this paper I shall begin analyzing the concept of local realism and its
relevance in physics (Sec. 2). Then I shall sketch the derivation of Bell´s
inequalities, distinguishing those which follow just from local realism (Sec.
3) from those which require auxiliary assumptions (Sec. 4). After that I shall
review the experiments aimed at testing local realism vs. quantum mechanics
(Secs. 5 and 6). Then I shall rebute the standard wisdom that quantum
mechanics is incompatible with quantum mechanics (Sec.7). Finally, after a
digression on philosophy and sociology of science (Sec. 8) I shall discuss the
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consequences to be drawn from the performed experiments (Sec. 9).
II. Local realism and its relevance in natural science
It is not easy to define realism with a few words, as is proved by the
existence of whole books devoted to the subject. Here I shall give a simple
definition appropriate for physics. Realism is the belief that material bodies
have properties independent of any observation, and that the results of any
possible measurement depend on these properties. The said properties may
be called “elements of reality”3 and are frequently identified with hidden
variables4 ,5 . However I think that the latter correspond rather to the
parameters used for the description of the said properties and should not be
confused with the former.
Realism alone, as defined above, does not contradict quantum mechanics.
In order to clarify the point I shall give an example. If I throw upwards a
coin, after a while the coin will collide with, say, a table and will soon become
at rest on it, with either the head or the tail upwards. The described exper-
iment consists, as is typical, of the preparation of the state of a system (the
coin thrown upwards) followed by the evolution of the system and finishing
by the measurement of a quantity on it. Our intuition says that the result
(head or tail) is determined by the elements of reality of the coin during the
fly. Or maybe, taking into account the unavoidable existence of non-idealties
(e.g. friction with the air), the elements of reality just determine the proba-
bility of the result. In any case we should carefully distinguish between the
observable (head or tail) and the elements of reality ( associated to motion
of the coin). The relevant lesson of our example is that the result of a mea-
surment depends on both the measured system (the coin) and the measuring
apparatus (the table). Sometimes the observable (head-tail in our example)
is even devoid of sense without the measuring apparatus (the table). There-
fore it is not so strange that quantum mechanics forbids the “simultaneous
existence of definite values for some observables”, namely those which cannot
be measured toghether. This is the essential content of the Kochen-Specker
theorem forbidding non-contextual hidden variables.5 Our example shows
that the validity of the theorem does not preclude realism.
Some quantum physicists may consider that realism is just a philosoph-
ical opinion which may or may not be true, but I disagree. In my view
natural science would be impossible without accepting realism as defined
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above. Actually, even the most pragmatic quantum physicists would admit
that states of physical systems have some “capabilities” of influencing the re-
sults of eventual future measurements on the system. It is a rather semantic
question whether we name these capabilities “elements of reality”.
Locality is the belief that no influence may be transmitted with a speed
greater than that of light. Thus we might identify locality with relativistic
causality. The concept of locality is subtle, however. In fact, quantum me-
chanics is local in the sense that it forbids the transmission of superluminal
signals (say from a human being to another one), but local realism as an-
alyzed here is stronger than that. At a difference with the idea of realism
which I consider as an unvoidable requirement for the existence of science,
locality derives from our experience at the macroscopic level and might be vi-
olated without demolishing the whole building of physics. That is, we might
assume that some influences travel at a speed greater than that of light even
if this fact does not allow the transmission of superluminal signals. This
seemed the position of John Bell6 .
In spite of this I think that locality is also important, that is local realism
is so fundamental a principle of physics that it should not be rejected without
extremely strong reasons, an opinion which I believe is quite close to what
Einstein mantained until his death7 . On the other hand the question of local
hidden variables is less relevant than the question of local realism. It is true
that if local realism is untrue local hidden variables would be impossible, but
if local realism is true local hidden variables may still be useless in practice,
although possible in principle. Thus I shall refer to local realism, rather than
to local hidden variables, in the rest of this article.
III. The Bell inequalities
From what we have said it might appear that local realism is a purely
philosophical concept. But a physical necessary condition for local realism
was introduced by John Bell8 as follows: Any correlation between measure-
ments performed at different places should derive from events which happened
in the intersection of the past light cones of the measurements. In order to
give an empirical content to the statement Bell considered a generic experi-
ment consisting of the preparation of a pair of particles (or, more generally,
physical systems) which are let to evolve in such a way that the two particles
go to macroscopically distant regions ( the argument that follows has been
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exposed in more detail elsewhere.9) Thus Bell searched for the probability,
p(A,a;B,b), of getting the result a in the measurement of an observable A
of the first particle and the result b in the measurement of the observable
B of the second particle. He proposed that, if local realism holds true, the
probability could be written
p(A, a;B, b) =
∫
ρ(λ)P1(λ;A, a)P2(λ;B, b)dλ, (1)
where λ is one or several parameters which contain all relevant information
about the intersection of the past light cones of the two measurements. An
expression similar to (1) for the total probability p(A, a), of getting the result
a in the measurement of the observable A on the first particle, follows at once
from the fact that it is unity the sum of probabilities associated to particle
2. That is
p(A, a) =
∑
b
∫
ρ(λ)P1(λ;A, a)P2(λ;B, b)dλ =
∫
ρ(λ)P1(λ;A, a)dλ. (2)
From now on we shall consider only dichotomic observables, so that the result
of the measurement of the observable A may be only 1 (yes) or 0 (not). Thus
we shall simplify the notation writing P1(λ,A) (or P2(λ,B) ) for P1(λ;A, a)
(or P2(λ;B, b)), and p(A,B) ( or p(A)) for the left side of (1) ( (2)) so that
eqs.(1) and (2) will be written
p(A) =
∫
ρ(λ)P1(λ,A)dλ, p(A,B) =
∫
ρ(λ)P1(λ,A)P2(λ,B)dλ. (3)
The functions P and ρ in the formula fulfil the conditions required for
probabilities and probability densities, respectively. That is
ρ(λ) ≥ 0,
∫
ρ(λ)dλ = 1, (4)
P1(λ,A), P2(λ,B) ≥ 0, (5)
P1(λ,A), P2(λ,B) ≤ 1. (6)
It is important to stress that the value of P1(λ,A) is assumed to be inde-
pendent of B, that is independent on what measurement is performed on the
second particle, which is Bell´s condition of locality. This independence has
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been called “parameter independence”, which is compatible with a possible
“outcome dependence”, that is the results of the measurements of A and B
may be correlated.10 Hence, using the notation A´, B ´ for the result 0 in
the measurement of A and B respectively, we obtain a similar independence
for the measurable probabilities
p(A) = p(A,B) + p(A,B′) = p(A,D) + p(A,D′) = ...
Parameter independence holds true also in quantum mechanics and it guar-
antees that superluminal communication is not possible.
From the conditions (3) to (6) it is possible to derive inequalities involv-
ing only measurable probabilities. We consider an experiment in which we
prepare once and again, say 4N times (N ≫ 1), a pair of particles in a given
state, the same for all preparations. Here, the same means that the parame-
ters which may be controlled in the preparation have the same values. After
N preparations, chosen at random amongst the 4N made, we measure the
dichotomic observables A and B of the two particles. After another N prepa-
rations, also chosen at random, we measure the dichotomic observables C and
D. Similarly C with B are measured N times, and A with D also N times. We
assume that the result of the measurement of any of the observables may be
either 0 or 1, and call p(A, B) the probability of getting the result 1 for both
observables, A and B (the frequencies measured in the experiment should
approach the probabilities if N is large enough). Similarly we may define the
probabilities p(A, D), p(C, B) and p(C, D), and also the probability p(A)
corresponds to getting the value 1 in the measurement of A and any value
(1 or 0) in the measurement of B, or D, performed on the partner particle,
and similar for p(B). It is an easy task to derive, from(1) to (6) , inequalities
involving measurable probabilities. For instance11
p(A,B) + p(A,D) + p(C,B)− p(C,D) ≤ p(A) + p(B). (7)
This inequality may be related to the existence of a “metric” in the set of
propositions associated to the results “yes”, “no” in the four measurements.
In fact we may define a formal (not measurable) joint probability distribution
on the observables {A, B, C, D} by means of expressions similar to (3) applied
to the four observables, the six pairs {AB,AC,AD,BC,BD,CD} and the
four triples {ABC,ABD,ACD,BCD} , in spite of some of them not being
actually measurable (e. g. p(A,C) cannot be got empirically because A and C
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correspond to alternative, incompatible, measurements on the same particle).
Now the mere possibility of defining a formal joint probability implies the
existence of a metric in the set of propositions (yes-no experiments) and the
essential property of the metric is the fulfillement of triangle inequalities,
which are closely related to the inequality (7). But I shall not pursue the
subject here (details may be seen elsewhere.12)
IV. Bell´s vs. tested inequalities. The CHSH case.
Soon after Bell´s discovery1 in 1964, it was realized that no performed
experiment had shown a violation of local realism. Furthermore, no simple
experiment could do the job. In my view, the difficulty is a proof that it is
wrong the wisdom according to which quantum mechanics predicts “highly
non-local effects”. The truth is that non-local effects, if any, are extremely
weak and difficult to observe.
In 1969 Clauser, Horne, Shimony and Holt (CHSH)13 made the first se-
rious proposal for an empirical test of Bell´s inequality . They suggested
the measurement of the polarization correlation of optical photon pairs. By
optical we mean that the corresponding frequencies are in the visible, the
near ultraviolet or the near infrared parts of the spectrum. The mentioned
authors derived the Bell inequality
S ≡ E(A,B) + E(A,D) + E(C,B)−E(C,D) ≤ 2, (8)
where {A, C} correspond to two possible positions of a polarization analyzer
for the first photon and { B, D} for the second. The correlations are defined
by
E(X, Y ) = p++(X, Y ) + p−−(X, Y )− p+−(X, Y )− p−+(X, Y ), (9)
with X = A or C, Y = B or D, p++(X, Y ) being the probability that the
polarization of the first photon is found in the plane X, and that of the
second in the plane Y, p+−(X, Y ) the probability that the polarization of
the first photon is found in the plane X and that of the second is in the plane
perpendicular to B, etc.
It is not difficult to see that the (8) inequality is equivalent to (7) provided
that the sum of the four probabilities involved is unity, that is
p++(X, Y ) + p−−(X, Y ) + p+−(X, Y ) + p−+(X, Y ) = 1. (10)
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In fact in this case it is easy to go from (8) to (7) , or viceversa, by repeated
use of relations like
p++(X, Y ) = p(X, Y ), p+−(X, Y ) = p(X)− p(X, Y ),
p−−(X, Y ) = 1− p(Y )− p+−(X, Y ). (11)
With respect to the empirical tests, however, the two inequalities look rather
different, and only the inequality (7) may be easily adjusted to actual exper-
iments. In fact, in the experiments either eq.(10) is not true, thus (8) not
being a true Bell inequality (it cannot be derived from local realism alone)
or the quantities E(X,Y) are no longer correlations, as we explain in the
following.
In typical experiments there are two arms in the apparatus, each one
consisting of a lens system followed by a polarization analyzer (polarizer,
for short) and a detector (for the moment we do not consider the case of
two-channel analyzers, but see below). Thus we may interpret p(X,Y) as the
probability that both photons are detected, after crossing the appropriate
polarizers, and p(X) the probability that the “red” photon of the pair is
detected, with independence of what happens to the “green” photon (for
clarity of exposition we attach fictitious colours, red and green, to the photons
of a pair). However, if this interpretation is carried upon the quantities
E(X,Y), via the relations (11) , such quantities would be correlations only
in the case that both photons of every pair arrive at the polarizers and
every photon is detected (with 100% efficiency) whenever it has crossed the
corresponding polarizer. But this idealized situation never happens.
The current practice in recent experiments is to use two-channel polar-
izers, with a detector after each outgoing channel. Attaching the labels +
or - to the detectors after the first or second outgoing channel of a polar-
izer, respectively, it is possible to define p++ as the probability that both
photons are detected in detectors with label +, p+− the probability that the
red photon is detected in a detector with label + and the green photon in
a detector with label -, etc. With this interpretation the quantities E(X,Y)
of (9) are indeed true correlations and the inequality (8) is never violated
in actual experiments, because all probabilities p++, p+−, etc. are much
smaller than unity due to the low collection-detection efficiency (i. e. for
most photon pairs only one photon, or none, is detected). The “solution”
proposed for this problem has been to renormalize the probabilities defining
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the correlations by
E∗(X, Y ) =
p++(X, Y ) + p−−(X, Y )− p+−(X, Y )− p−+(X, Y )
p++(X, Y ) + p−−(X, Y ) + p+−(X, Y ) + p−+(X, Y )
. (12)
Thus people use the inequality (compare with (8))
S∗ ≡ E∗(A,B) + E∗(A,D) + E∗(C,B)−E∗(C,D) ≤ 2, (13)
in the empirical tests. Indeed, this is the inequality violated in most of the
recent experiments. The inequality, however, cannot be derived from eqs.(3)
to (6) alone (without additional assumptions) and therefore it is not a genuine
Bell inequality.
V. Experiments using optical photons
The first experimental test using optical photons was made by Freedman
and Clauser.14 They used photon pairs produced in the decay of excited cal-
cium atoms via a 0-1-0 cascade. That is, the initial and final atomic states
had 0 total angular momentum, so that the two emitted photons were entan-
gled in polarization. The dichotomic observables measured were detection
or non-detection of a photon, after it passed through a polarizer . The la-
bels A and C are associated to two different positions of the polarizer for
the “red” photon and similarly B and D for the “green” one. The authors
were aware that the inequality (7) could not be violated with the technology
of the moment because the detection efficiencies of the available detectors
were too small (less than 10%.) As the left hand side of the inequality (7)
is proportional to the efficiency squared, whilst the right side is proportional
to the efficiency, the latter is more than ten times the former, so that the
inequality is very well fulfilled.
More specifically, the predition of quantum mechanics for the experiment
may be summarized as follows, with some simplifications for the sake of
clarity. The measurable quantities in the experiment are the single rates, R1
and R2, and coincidence rate, R12(φ), the latter being a function of the angle,
φ, between the polarizer´s planes X and Y. In terms of the production rate,
R0, in the source they are given by
R1(A) = R2(B) =
1
2
R0η, R12(X, Y ) =
1
4
R0η
2α(1 + V cos (2φ)). (14)
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Here α is an angular correlation parameter and η is the overall detection
efficiency of a photon, which includes collection efficiency and quantum ef-
ficiency of the detectors (for simplicity we put the same efficiency η for the
red and the green photons, which is approximately true in practice, but the
generalization would be rather trivial). In actual experiments the quantum
prediction (14) is confirmed, except for small deviations which are not con-
sidered significant.
The probabilities needed to test the inequality (7) are just the ratios
p(A) =
R1
R0
, p(B) =
R2
R0
, p(X, Y ) =
R12(φ)
R0
.
The production rate, R0, is not measured but it is not difficult to show that,
if we insert (14) into (7) , R0 cancels out and the inequality becomes
αη
[
1 +
1
2
V
(
3∑
1
cos(2φj)− cos (2φ4)
)]
≤ 2,
where {φj} are the angles between the polarization planes of the analyzers,
that is between A and B, A and D, C and B, C and D, respectively. These
angles fulfil φ1 + φ4 = φ2 + φ3 and the maximum of
∑
3
1 cos(2φj)− cos (2φ4)
with that constraint is 2
√
2. Thus the Bell inequality (15) holds true, for any
choice of polarizers positions, whenever
αη
(
1 +
√
2V
)
≤ 2. (15)
In the actual experiment14 V ≃ 0.85, but η ≃0.0001, and α ≃ 1, so that the
inequality was safely fulfilled (η is the product of the quantum efficiency, ζ, of
a detector times the collection efficiency of the apertures, see below eq.(19)).
Freedman and Clauser14 found a “solution”, to circumvent the problem
of the low detection efficiency, consisting of the replacement of condition
(6) by another one, called “no-enhancement”, which they claimed plausible.
This assumption states that, for any value of the parameter λ, the following
inequality holds true:
P1(λ,A) ≤ P1(λ,∞), P2(λ,B) ≤ P2(λ,∞) (16)
where Pj(λ,∞) are the probabilities of detection of the photon with the
corresponding polarizer removed. From inequalities (1) to (5) plus (16), the
authors14 derived the inequality
p(A,B) + p(A,D) + p(C,B)− p(C,D) ≤ p(A,∞) + p(∞, B), (17)
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where p(A,∞) ( p(∞, B) ) is the probability of coincidence detection with
the polarizer corresponding to the red (green) photon removed. The results
of the measurement, and the quantum predictions, for these probabilities are
p(A,∞) = p(∞, B) = 1
2
αη2,
and the inequality (17) implies
(
1 +
√
2V
)
≤ 2⇔ V ≤
√
2/2, (18)
to be compared with (15) . This was the inequality tested, and violated, in
the commented experiment.
Note that, in sharp contrast with the obvious inequality (6) , the inequal-
ity (16) is not only empirically untestable, it is counterfactual. In fact, as
said above, λ is a set of parameters which contains all relevant information
about the intersection of the past light cones of the measurements. But the
past light cone of one measurement (with a polarizer in place) is necessar-
ily different from the past light cone of a different measurement (with the
polarizer removed). In order to give a meaning to the inequality (16) it is
necessary to compare a fact (one of the measurements) with a belief (about
what would have happened in a different experiment having the same past
light cone). For this reason I say that the inequality is counterfactual. Of
course, it may be checked empirically that the average over λ of the left hand
side is not greater than the average of the right hand side, that is for any light
beam the detection rate does not increase when we insert a polarizer. (How-
ever, it might increase if we insert a polarization rotator plus a polarization
analyzer when the incoming light is linearly polarized ). In summary, the
first alleged empirical disproof of local realism rests upon a counterfactual
belief qualified as plausible. Therefore, strictly speaking, it did not test local
realism. However I do not mean that the experiment was useless because it
opened an important new line of experimental research.
In the decade that followed the commented experiment, several similar
atomic-cascade experiments were performed15 ,16 . In addition to the re-
quirement of introducing untestable auxiliary assumptions (like (16)), all of
them had the problem of being static. That is, the positions of the polarizers
were fixed well before the detection events took place. Therefore the exper-
iments could not test locality, in the sense of relativistic causality. In order
to solve the problem, Alain Aspect and coworkers17 performed in 1982 a new
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atomic-cascade experiment where (in some sense) the polarizers positions
were chosen when the photons were already in fly. However the inequality
tested was of the type (17) rather than a genuine Bell inequality like (7) .
The experiment of Aspect is usully presented as the definite refutation
of local realism. One of the reasons is that, during the preparation of the
experiment, Aspect was in close contact with Bell, who approved it. Al-
though Bell was aware that there existed a loophole due to the low efficiency
of the available photon detectors, he considered acceptable to make a fair
sampling assumption. That is, to extrapolate the results actually got in the
experiment, with low efficiency detectors, to detectors 100% efficient. This
amounts to testing an inequality obtained from (7) by dividing the right hand
side by the efficiency, η, and the left side by η2. The inequality so obtained is
practically the same as (17) . The fair sampling assumption was justified by
Bell18 with the frequently quoted sentence: “It is hard for me to believe that
quantum mechanics works so nicely for inefficient practical set-ups and is yet
going to fail badly when sufficient refinements are made.” But this sentence
cannot be applied to the commented experiments because the predictions of
quantum mechanics for any atomic-cascade experiment are compatible with
local realism even if the experiment is made with ideal set-up, in particular
100% efficiency detectors, as is shown in the following.19 Apparently Bell
was not aware of this fact before he untimely died in october 1990.
The atomic cascade decay, giving rise to a photon pair, is a three-body
problem with the consequence that the angle, χ, between the directions of
emission of the two photons is almost uniformily distributed over the sphere.
This implies that the angular correlation parameter α (see (14)) is almost
independent of the angle χ, that is α (χ) ≃ 1. On the other hand both
the overall detection efficiency, η, and the “visibility”, V, of the coincidence
curve are functions of the angle, θ, determined by the apertures of the lens
system (as seen from the source). The dependence V(θ) is a loss of polariza-
tion correlation when the “red” and “green” photons do not have opposite
wavevectors. In the Aspect experiment, as in other atomic-cascade experi-
ments, the predicted functions are15
η =
1
2
(1− cos θ)ζ, V = 1− 2
3
(1− cos θ)2, α ≃ 1, (19)
where ζ is the quantum efficiency of the detectors. Using these expressions it
is easy to see that the maximum value of the left hand side of (15) is about
0.74 ζ, and the inequality is safelly fulfilled even for ideal detectors (i. e.
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ζ = 1). The figure should be multiplied times 2, giving 1.48 ζ, if we assume
that both photons , red and green, may be detected in either detector. But
still the inequality (15) holds true for any ζ (≤ 1). In summary taking into
account the low angular correlation of the photon pairs produced in atomic
cascades, these experiments cannot discriminate between local realism and
quantum mechanics. In spite of this fact, the Aspect experiment is quoted
everywhere as the definite refutation of local realism.
The problem of the lack of angular correlation might be solved if the recoil
atom were detected20 but that experiment would be extremely difficult. A
more simple solution is to use optical photon pairs produced in the process
of parametric down conversion, and this has been the source common in all
experiments since about 1984. See, for instance, the paper by Kurtsiefer et
al.21 and references therein. At a difference with atomic-cascade experiments,
here the photons have a good angular correlation. In fact the parameter α of
(14) as a function of the angle, χ, between the wavevectors of the two photons
is such that the probability of detection of the green photon conditional to
the detection of the red one is just the quantum efficiency ζ (or close to it.)
Thus putting the detectors in appropriate places we may rewrite (15) with ζ
substituted for αη, that is
ζ
(
1 +
√
2V
)
≤ 2. (20)
This inequality might be violated if V is close to 1 (which is achievable in
actual experiments) and ζ > 2
(√
2− 1
)
≃ 0.82. But such a high value of
the detection efficiency has not yet been achieved and the low efficiency of
detectors remains as a persistent loophole for the disproof of local realism.
This difficulty has led to the use of the modified CHSH inequality (13)
as the standard inequality tested in practically all recent experiments with
optical photons. These experiments use two-channel polarizers, and the pre-
diction of quantum mechanics for them may be summarized in terms of four
coincidence detection rates as follows
R++ (φ) = R−− (φ) =
1
2
ηR0 [1 + V cos (2φ)] ,
R+− (φ) = R−+ (φ) = R++
(
φ+
pi
2
)
, (21)
whilst the single rates are usually not measured (or, at least, not reported
as relevant). In the actual experiments there are small departures from (21)
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which are not considered significant, but may be relevant for the reasons
(see end of this section.) As said above the inequality tested is (13) , and
the probabilities involved may be obtained from (21) as ratios between the
measured coincidence rates and the production rate. That is, putting (21)
into (12) we get
E∗ = V cos (2φ) . (22)
If this is used in (13) , steps similar to those leading to (18) give
S∗ = 2
√
2V ≤ 2⇔ V ≤
√
2/2. (23)
This inequality looks the same as (18), but here V is obtained from measure-
ments using two-channel polarizers. In practice V may be got by at least
three different procedures:
1) From the best fit of the measured correlation, E(φ), to the theoretical
curve (9), where the probabilities, p++(φ), etc., are the ratios of measured
rates, R++(φ), etc., to the production rate, R0. It is easy to see that the
fitting does not require the measurement of R0. We shall label just V the
quantity so obtained.
2) As half the “visibility” of the empirical curve E (φ) , that is the dif-
ference between the maximum and the minimum values divided by the sum.
Again the value of R0 is not required. I shall label VA this quantity.
3) From the value of S∗ measured for the angles φ1 = φ2 = φ3 = pi/8, φ4 =
3pi/8, using the first equality (23) . These angles provide the maximum value
of S∗ if the empirical data agree with (21) . This value will be labelled VB and
it is the quantity commonly used in the test of the inequality (23). Indeed
in recent times it has become standard practice to claim that local realism
is refuted whenever VB >
√
2/2.
According to quantum predictions the equality V = VA = VB should hold
true, but in actual experiments there are small differences between them.
On the other hand some natural families of local realistic models predict
inequalities involving the quantities VA and VB.
22 One of these inequalities
has already been tested with the result that it is fulfilled, whilst the equality
predicted by quantum mechanics seems to be violated.23
A procedure to circumvent the low efficiency loophole in experiments
with optical photons has been proposed recently using homodyne detection
instead of photon counting,2425 .
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VI. Other experiments aimed at testing local realism
In his pioneer work1 Bell used the example of an Einstein-Podolsky-
Rosen-Bohm26 system, that is a pair of spin-1/2 particles with zero total
spin. Thus it is not strange that some experiments have been proposed con-
sisting of the measurement of the spin correlation of two spin-1/2 particles.
The use of massive particles has the advantage that they may be quite re-
liably detected, so that such experiments do not suffer from the detection
loophole. The proposed experiments use non-relativistic particles. As far
as I know, no experiment of this kind has been proposed using relativistic
particles. The reason is probably the difficulty for producing a pair with
zero total spin if we take into account that spin of relativistic particles is
not stricly conserved (only the total angular momentum of a free particle is
strictly conserved in Dirac´s theory).
The non-relativistic particles present the problem that it is difficult to
guarantee the space-like separation of the measurements. As an example, we
may consider the experiment proposed by Lo and Shimony.27 It consists of
the dissociation of molecules with two sodium atoms followed by the mea-
surement of their spins by means of a Stern-Gerlach apparatus. The typical
velocity of the sodium atoms, after dissociation, is about 3000 m/s and the
length of the measuring magnets 0.25 m. this giving a measurement time
about 10−4s. Thus, in order that the measurements were space-like separated,
the Stern-Gerlach apparatused should be distant by more than 30 km. It is
rather obvious that such experiment could not be a practical test of local re-
alism as defined above. Similar problems appear in the proposed experiment
by Adelberger and Jones28 using neutron pairs. The neutrons should collide
at low energy in order to insure a pure S-wave scattering so that, by Pauli´s
principle, the total spin should be zero. Again the distance between the spin
measurements (by scattering with magnetized material) should be extremely
large in order to be possible the violation of locality (relativistic causality).
In addition there are fundamental constraints, derived from Heisenberg
uncertainty principle, on experiments using non-relativistic particles.29 For
instance, let us assume that the particle detectors are static and placed on
opposite sides and at a distance L from the source each, so that the distance
between detectors is 2L. If the particles have mass m (the same for both, for
simplicity) and travel at a velocity v, then the initial position and velocity
are uncertain by, at least, ∆x∆v = h¯/2m. Thus the arrival time at the de-
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tectors will be uncertain by, at least,
√
2h¯L/(mv3). We may be sure that the
measurements are space-like separated only if this quantity is smaller than
2L/c, which leads to the constraint L≥ 2h¯c2/(mv3), a macroscopic quantity
(for instance, in the experiment proposed by Lo and Shimony27 this gives
about 1 m.) The quantity is not so big as to put unsurmountable practi-
cal difficulties, but it shows that a Bell test using non-relativistic particles
requires measurements made at quite macroscopic distances.
An experiment using the scattering of non-relativistic protons was per-
formed by Lamehi-Rachti and Mittig in 1976.30 The spin components of
the protons were measured by scattering on carbon foils. The experimen-
tal results agreed with quantum predictions, but the auxiliary assumptions
needed for the experiment to be a test of a Bell inequality were stronger than
in experiments with optical photons. An experiment has been recently per-
formed31 using two 9Be+ ions in a trap, each of which behaves as a two-state
systems. It has been claimed, and widely commented, that the experiment
“has closed the detection loophole” because the atoms may be detected with
100% efficiency. However the distance between ions in the trap, 3µm, was
very small. Although this distance is about 100 times the size of an ion
wavepacket, it is 106 times smaller than the wavelength of the photons in-
volved in the atomic transitions between the two levels (compare with the
fundamental constraints commented in the previous paragraph). In these
conditions the experiment cannot test locality in the sense of relativistic
causality.
A loophole-free experiment involving spin measurements of atoms has also
been proposed. It consists of the disociation of mercury molecules followed
by the measurement of nuclear spin correlation of the atoms.32 In order
to make the measurment time very short, the idea was to use a polarized
pulse of laser light, which would induce selectively the ionization of the atom
when it is in one specific spin state (say up) but not in the other possible
state (down). After several years of preparation, the detailed proposal of the
experiment was published in 1995, but nine years later no results have been
reported. (In the Oviedo Conference, held in July 2002, Fry reported that
important difficulties had been found. Fry´s talk was not published in the
proceedings33).
Many other experimental tests of a Bell inequality have been performed
or proposed, each one suffering from loopholes. For instance, several experi-
ments have been performed measuring the polarization correlation of gamma
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rays produced in the decay of positronium, one of the experiments violating
the quantum prediction.16 These experiments have the difficulty that the
polarization cannot be measured with high enough precision.
There have been also proposals using high energy particles. For instance,
the strangeness oscillations of pairs K0 −K0 have been the subject of many
papers34 ,35 , but no loophole-free violation of a Bell inequality seems possible
in this case due to the small decay time of the short K0 in comparison with
the oscillation period. Also an experiment has been recently performed using
B0 mesons,36 but here also the damping made impossible the violation of a
Bell inequality, and only a normalization of the correlation function to the
undecayed pair leads to the violation of (13), not a genuine Bell inequality.
In recent years a lot of effort has been devoted to the so-called “tests
without inequalities”.37 The idea is to prepare a system in some state and
perform a measurement such that the quantum prediction is definite (say
“yes”) but the prediction of any local realistic model is the opposite (“no”).
For a proof of the incompatibility between local realism and quantum me-
chanics, in ideal experiments, the proposal is very appealing but from a
practical point of view the possible experiments are less reliable than those
resting upon Bell´s inequalities. In particular they require an extreme con-
trol of the purity of the prepared state, which is not the case in the Bell tests
(see section 4). An experimental test of local realism resting upon the idea
has been performed,38 but the experiment is not conclusive, as is shown be
the existence of a local model reproducing the results.39
In summary, no performed experiment has been able to test a genuine Bell
inequality with the condition that the measurements are performed at space-
like separation. And, as far as I know, only a detailed proposal for a loophole-
free experiment with available technology exists,32 but this experiment seems
to present unsurmountable difficulties. In consequence local realism has not
been refuted. Furthermore it is the case that, strictly speaking, local realism
has not yet been tested against quantum mechanics. That is no experiment
has been performed able to discriminate between local realism and quantum
mechanics.
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VII. Is quantum mechanics truly incompatible with
local realism?
The standard wisdom of the community of quantum physicists is that
local realism does not hold true in nature. Certainly this opinion does not
follow from just the results of the empirical tests of Bell´s inequalities be-
cause, as commented in the two previous sections, there are loopholes in all
performed experiments. Actually the current wisdom derives from the theo-
retical argument that the validity of local realism would imply that quantum
mechanics is false (Bell´s theorem). And, for good reasons, nobody is willing
to accept that quantum mechanics is wrong. Thus the scientific community
dismisses the mentioned loopholes as irrelevant (see, e. g., the relatively re-
cent article by Laloe¨,40 excelent in most other respects.) However a violation
of local realism is no more acceptable than a violation of quantum mechanics,
for the reasons explained in section 2. Consequently there exists a real prob-
lem whose only solution seems to me the compatibility of local realism with
quantum mechanics, or some “small” modification of this theory. But, is it
possible to modify quantum mechanics without destroying its formal beauty
and its impressive agreement with experiments?. In the following I argue for
this possibility.
According to the traditional formulation, quantum mechanics consists
of two quite different ingredients: the formalism (including the equations)
and the theory of measurement, both of which are postulated independently.
(Actually the two ingredients are to some extent contradictory, because
the quantum evolution is continuous and deterministic except during the
measurement, where the “collapse of the wavefuction” is discontinuous and
stochastic. Thus the modern approach tends to remove any postulated theory
of measurement, see below). We must assume that the quantum equations
are correct, because the extremely accurate agreement between the predicted
and the measured, for instance in quantum electrodynamics, cannot be ex-
plained otherwise. In contrast, only a small part of the quantum theory of
measurement is really used in most experiments, which suggests that it might
be substantially weakened. For instance, the postulate about position mea-
surements, i. e. Born´s rule, is enough for the interpretation of all scattering
experiments.
The point is that standard proofs of “Bell´s theorem” rest upon the the-
ory of measurement (and preparation of states). In fact, in a typical proof
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it it assumed that: 1) A pure spin zero state of a system of two spin-1/2
particles may be manufactured in the laboratory with the two particles able
to fly, mantaining the same joint spin state, up to macroscopic distances, b)
The spin projection of each particle, along any freely chosen direction, may
be measured with arbitrary small error. Both these assumptions might be
false without any danger for the formalism and the basic equations (Dirac´s,
Maxwell´s, etc.) of the theory. Consequently I guess that a weakening of the
standard measurement theory, without touching the formalism, might make
quantum mechanics compatible with local realism. For instance, the weak-
ening of the preparation and measurement assumptions might be as follows.
It is frequently assumed that there is an one-to-one correspondence between
the possible states of a given physical system and the vectors in the Hilbert
space, except for superselection rules. That assumption is called superposi-
tion principle. But the unrestricted superposition principle also implies an
one-to-one correspondence between self-adjoint operators and observables.
This is because any self-adjoint operator may be written as a linear com-
bination of projectors onto its eigenstates (i. e. subspaces in the Hilbert
space) and each projector should be an observable if all states are physically
realizable and distinguishable. However the one-to-one correspondence be-
tween self-adjoint operators and observables is far too strong from a physical
point of view because, how could we measure an observable like xmpn+pnxm
with very large integers m and n?. Thus it seems more appropriate to as-
sume that only some self-adjoint operators represent observables and only
some vectors represent states. We might go a step further and assume that
only some density matrices represent physical realizable states. (For instance
we might restrict the states to density matrices fulfilling an inequality like
Tr(ρ2) ≤ k < 1 which, for some k, might be sufficient to prevent the violation
of Bell´s inequalities.41 But I mention this possibility just as an illustrative
example.)
If any proof of Bell´s theorem resting upon the quantum theory of mea-
surement is invalid, a correct proof should involve a detailed study of how
to prepare the state and how to measure the observables able to violate a
Bell inequality. But the definite proof that some state and measurements
may be really made in the laboratory is to perform the actual experiment.
Thus I conclude that Bell´s “theorem” cannot be proved by theoretical argu-
ments, i. e. it is not a theorem. It is just an argument suggesting that some
experiments might exist able to discriminate between quantum and local re-
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alistic predictions. This conclusion does not mean a low valuation of Bell´s
work, which I consider one of the most important achievements in theoretical
physics of the last 50 years. In any case Bell never used the word ”theorem”
in this context, as far as I know.
In the modern approach, quantum measurement theory is not postulated
but an attempt is made at deriving it from the quantum formalism. I shall
analyze the results of this approach in the particular example of an optical
photon counter. I write “counter” in order to distinguish it from other types
of light detector. For instance, in astronomy a typical observational method
is to take a photographic plate of some region of the sky. In this case the
intensity of the light may be measured with a small error using a long time of
exposure, but no count of individual photons is made. I also include the word
“optical” because a single high energy photon (e. g. a gamma ray) has a
large enough energy to be detected with a probability close to 100%. This is
not the case with optical photons. A counter of optical photons consists of a
macroscopic object (e. g. a piece of semiconductor) where there are quantum
systems (e. g. electrons) in metastable states. Typically the metastable state
appears because an external electric field is included which, combined with
the potential due to the ions, creates a potential well where the electron is
initially confined, separated by a barrier from another deeper well. When a
photon arrives at the detector an electron may make a transition, via a state
of the continuum, to the region of deeper potential where it starts moving,
this giving rise to an electric current which is amplified by the action of the
field. The important point is that, if the external electric field is too weak the
amplification does not take place but if it is too strong some counts may be
produced due to an electron crossing the potential barrier by tunnel effect.
That is, a trade-off exists between increasing the efficiency (decreasing the
false negative results) and decreasing the dark rate (the false positive counts).
I am not in a position to prove that this fundamental trade-off is enough to
prevent the existence of the optical photon counters required for loophole-free
tests of a Bell inequality. However, it is equaly difficult to prove rigorously
that there are no fundamental constraints preventing optical photon counters
reliable enough to allow loophole-free tests of local realism.
The current wisdom that the difficulties for manufacturing reliable optical
photon counters are not fundamental derives from a theoretical prejudice,
namely that optical photons are particles like electrons or atoms. If this
were true there would be no reason why detectors could not be manufactured
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having 100% efficiency and low noise. But I think that it is closer to the truth
the assumption that photons are just quanta of the electromagnetic field,
but not particles (Willis Lamb has supported strongly this opinion42). There
are two arguments, at least, against optical photons being particles similar
to electrons or atoms. Firstly there is no position operator for photons in
quantum mechanics, and secondly the photon number is usually not well
defined. That is, common states of light, like laser light or thermal light,
have an indefinite number of photons. A photon is (or should be associated
to) a wavepacket in the form of a needle whose length is of the order of the
coherence length, which for atomic emissions means centimeters, and several
wavelengths in transverse dimensions. This associates a volume bigger than
1016 atomic volumes to a typical optical photon. In sharp contrast, a gamma
ray photon may be associated to a volume smaller than that of an atom. If
we take the atomic volume as standard, we are led to say that high energy
photons are localized entities (behaving mainly as particles) whilst optical
photons are not localized (behaving mainly as waves).
In any test of local realism using photons, it is necessary to measure
both, the position of the photon and another quantity like polarization or
phase. The former may be called a particle property whilst the latter is a
wave property. Thus, if we remember the Bell inequality (20) , it is natu-
ral to associate the parameters ζ (detection efficiency) and V (visibility of
the polarization correlation curve) to those two quantities and conclude that
the Bell inequality forbids a photon behaving as a particle and as a wave
at the same time. In contrast, the tested inequality (23) just constrains the
“amount of wave behaviour, V ”. Thus its violation means that we cannot
dismiss the wave character of optical photons. On the other hand, tests us-
ing gamma rays do not have any problem with the position measurement (i.
e. the efficiency of detection), but there are difficulties for a precise mea-
surement of polarization, as commented in section 6. Thus I propose that,
in tests using photons, a trade-off exists between measurability of position
and measurability of polarization, trade-off quantified by the Bell inequality
(20). The “corpuscular” property (position), may be accurately measured
only in photons much smaller than atoms, like gammas, the “wave” property
(polarization), in those much larger than atoms, like optical photons.
These and other examples suggest that quantum mechanics may be com-
patible with local realism, the violations predicted deriving from the ideal-
izations used in the standard calculations, like perturbative approximations,
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neglect of tunneling, etc. Maybe the reader does not agree, but certainly the
problem is open and the sober attitude is to analyze the empirical results
without the common bias that the validity of local realism would imply that
quantum theory is wrong.
VIII. Digression on philosophy and sociology of sci-
ence
For the analysis of significance of the results obtained in the performed
tests of local realism it is convenient to make a digression on philosophy and
sociology of science. The pragmatic approach to quantum mechanics, which
is the basis of the Copenhagen interpretation, has led to an “antimetaphys-
ical” attitude, that is the idea that science should not be constrained at all
by any philosophical principle. I think that this position is not correct. Of
course, the philosophy of the natural world should rest upon knowledge de-
rived from science, and not viceversa, but it is also true that science itself
rests upon some philosophical principles.
One of the central principles of the philosophy of science is that there
is not symmetry between confirmation and refutation of a theory. In fact,
although a single experiment may refute a theory, no theory can ever be
absolutely confirmed by experiments, a principle stressed by Karl Popper.43
Thus the only possibility to increase the degree of confidence in a theory is
to perform many experiments able to refute it. If the results of these exper-
iments are compatible with the theory, it becomes increasingly supported.
We may apply this philosophy to the tests of Bell´s inequalities. As more
time elapses without a loophole-free violation of local realism, greater should
be our confidence on the validity of this principle.
Another philosophical point which is required in any serious discussion of
the present status of local realism is that established theories are protected,
a fact stressed by Imre Lakatos.44 That is, when a new discovery seems
to contradict the theory, it is always possible to introduce some auxiliary
hypotheses which allow interpreting the new finding within the accepted
theory. It is well known the example put by Lakatos on the hypothetical
observation of an anomaly in the motion of a planet. It could be explained,
without rejecting Newton’s gravitational theory, by the existence of another,
unknown, planet. If this is not found by observation in the predicted place,
it might be assumed that there are two planets instead of one, etc. Indeed, it
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is a historical fact that no theory has been rejected by its contradiction with
a single or even several experiments (e. g. Newton´s gravity by the anomaly
in the motion of Mercury). The theory survives until a new, superior, theory
is available ( e. g. Newton’s gravity survived until the appearance of general
relativity.) The consequence of this sociological fact is that any argument
for a established theory is accepted without too much discussion, but any
argument against the theory is carefully analyzed in order to discover a flaw.
Thus, even a honest experimentalist will devote much more care searching
for possible errors if an experiment contradicts the assumed predictions of
quantum mechanics than if it confirms the theory.
A good example of this behaviour has happened in the early, atomic-
cascade, tests of Bell’s inequalities. As said in section 5 the first experiment
of that kind was performed by Freedman and Clauser14 and the results agreed
with quantum predictions. The second experiment was made by Holt and
Pipkin (see, e.g. the reviews by Clauser and Shimony15 or by Duncan and
Kleinpoppen.16) The results of the experiment disagreed with quantum pre-
dictions but did not violate the inequality (18) tested. The consequence is
that the experimental results were never formally published and many people
(including the authors) made a careful search for possible sources of error.
The Holt-Pipkin experiment had two main differences with the Freedman-
Clauser one: 1) the use of a cascade of atomic mercury, instead of calcium,
and 2) the use of calcite polarizers, instead of polarizers made of piles of
plates. In order to clarify the anomaly, Clauser45 “repeated” the Holt-Pipkin
experiment, that is performed a new experiment using mercury but, again,
piles of plates as polarizers. This time the results agreed with quantum pre-
dictions and violated the tested inequality (18). However the use of calcite
may be very relevant because it has an extremely good extinction ratio, less
than 10−4 to be compared with 0.02 for typical piles of plates. In contrast
calcite possesses bad efficiency for maximum transmission of linear polarized
light, about 80% to be compared with 98% for typical piles of plates. But
there are arguments supporting the opinion that it is the minimal, and not
the maximal, transmission of the polarizer what matters.46 In spite of this
fact, the Holt-Pipkin experiment has never been repeated in the sense of
using calcite polarizers.
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IX. Present status of local realism at the empirical
level
Now we arrive at the crucial question: Is local realism a valid principle
of physics?. The current wisdom is that it has been definitely refuted by
the optical experiments already performed, modulo some loopholes due to
nonidealities which, it is added, are quite common in experimental physics.
But, as explained in section 5, this is not true for the atomic-cascade ex-
periments (e. g. Aspect´s) because they do not discriminate between local
realism and quantum mechanics, not evedn in the ideal case. We are left
with experimental tests involving optical photons produced in the process of
parametric down-conversion (e.g. the mentioned experiment by Kurtsiefer
et al21). As discussed in section 5, these experiments cannot tests (genuine)
Bell inequalities due to the lack of reliable photon counters. If we exclude
the down-conversion experiments, the evidence against local realism is mea-
ger because all other tests present greater difficulties. It is true that the
efficiency loophole has been closed in experiments with atoms,31 what has
been used as an argument against the validity of local realism.47 In my
opinion the fact that loopholes appear in every experiment is an argument
for it. Indeed, it suggests that nature preserves local realism in every case.
Actually experiments like that of Rowe et al.31 do not test local realism but
non-contextuality (see Sec. 2), something which is not a principle to be
mantained.
In any case I claim that local realism is such a fundamental principle
that should not be dismissed without extremely strong arguments. It is a fact
that there is no direct empirical evidence at all for the violation of local
realism. The existing evidence is just that quantum mechanical predictions
are confirmed, in general, in tests of (non-genuine Bell) inequalities like (17)
or (13) . Only when this evidence is combined with theoretical arguments
(or prejudices) it might be argu¨ed that local realism is refuted. But, in my
opinion, this combination is too weak for such a strong conclusion. Thus
I propose that no loophole-free experiment is possible which violates local
realism.
This proposal remembers other negative statements, derived from failures
at the experimental level, which have been extremely important in the history
of physics. I shall put two examples. After James Watt made his heat engine
in 1765, many people attempted to increase the efficiency, but in some sense
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they failed. In fact, nobody was able to make a perpetuum mobile (of the
second kind), that is an engine able to produce useful work by just cooling a
large reservoir like the sea. It took sixty years to be realized, by Sadi Carnot,
that the aim was impossible because a (large) part of the extracted heat
should necessarily go to a colder reservoir. Carnot´s discovery led soon to the
statement of one of the most important principles of physics: the second law
of thermodynamics. Another example is the question of the absolute motion
of the Earth. Several attempts at measuring it failed, the most sophisticated
made by Michelson and Morley in 1887. The failure was “explained” less
than 20 years later by Einstein with the hypothesis that absolute motion
does not exist. Again, a repeated experimental failure led to a fundamental
physical law: the relativity principle.
Ian Percival48 has pointed out that, in classical physics, the second law
of thermodynamics does not contradict the laws of (Newtonian) mechanics,
but nevertheless it restrict the possible evolutions of physical systems. He
proposed that a similar physical principle might prevent the violation of local
realism without actually contradicting quantum mechanics. In my view this
is an interesting observation, because I presume that it is the second law,
with quantum noise taken into account, what may prevent the violation of
local realism in the quantum domain. I think that a better understanding
of the laws of thermodynamics at the quantum level is required. Indeed,
the traditional interpretation of the third law (zero entropy at zero Kelvin)
seems difficult to be reconciled with the existence of (non-thermal) quantum
vacuum fluctuations. In summary, a serious attention to the loopholes in the
empirical tests of the Bell inequalities, rather than their uncritical dismissal,
may improve our understanding of nature.
In any case the validity of local realism may be either refuted by a single
loophole-free experiment or increasingly confirmed by the passage of time
without such an experiment. This is the motivation for the title of the
present article.
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